Member tokens: reusable account credential authorizing key enrollment per node
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@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
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- Relay backpressure is global: any member's full queue 429s every publisher until drained (visible per §3, but one lagging member can stall the firehose — revisit before scale).
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- Member authority (Draft 0.5 §6): the MA-signed registry snapshot is authoritative when configured (`[node] registry` = file path or URL, `ma_key` pinned; monotonic version — rollback and forgery close the node; file path is mtime-reloaded, URL is fetched at start + every 60s and cached to `<data_dir>/registry-cache.json`, so outage fails static). Keys carry optional validity windows (`not_before`/`not_after`); rotation = `registry add-key` then `revoke-key`.
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- `<data_dir>/members.toml` (name, pubkey, class, `previous` keys, mtime-reloaded) is a dev/local fallback used only when no registry is configured; empty directory without a registry is open bootstrap only when `dev_bootstrap = true` (RFC §6: explicit dev flag). Receivers drop content-bearing responses from enrichment-class senders (metadata-only, §6).
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- MA tooling: `frxd registry init|add|add-key|revoke-key|remove|list|applications|approve|invite|set-relays|show|serve` (signed `registry.json` + `ma-key.hex` in `--dir`); `frxd init --id/--registry/--ma-key`; `frxd key show|rotate`; `member add --previous <old>` for the fallback path. A node with no `[node] relays` discovers them from the registry snapshot (`doc.relays`).
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- MA tooling: `frxd registry init|add|add-key|revoke-key|remove|list|applications|approve|invite|token|revoke-token|set-relays|show|serve` (signed `registry.json` + `ma-key.hex` in `--dir`); `frxd init --id/--registry/--ma-key`; `frxd key show|rotate`; `member add --previous <old>` for the fallback path. A node with no `[node] relays` discovers them from the registry snapshot (`doc.relays`).
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- Aggregate semantics are our implementation choices from a terse spec: requests are `aggregate` envelopes carrying only `period`; replies carry `sent` (broadcasts that month) / `passed` (responses consumed from that member); granularity floor is enforced as YYYY or YYYY-MM only (finer rejected), yearly rolls up months. Revisit with §10 sufficiency review.
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## Known gaps (Phase 2/3, intentional — don't fake them)
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@@ -50,6 +50,6 @@
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- Roles are not exclusive: a single node may issue queries and answer them concurrently (I5, §3 "any member"). Implement querier/responder as independent enable flags — never an exclusive mode enum or fixed deployment role.
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- Matching floor: boundary tokenizer (`src/tokenizer.rs` — letter/digit splits so `5555` matches `DLEX5555`, lowercase, ASCII fold, English stopwords+stemmer) → coverage gate (`[match] min_coverage`, default 0.4; 1–2 term queries require all terms) → title boost 2.0 + phrase boost 3.0 + query-time snippets. Schema changes require a fresh index dir (`open_or_create` errors on mismatch).
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- Engine seam: `src/engine.rs` `SearchEngine` trait (`search` → `EngineOutput { hits, total: Option<u64> }`, `doc_count`); `respond()` in `src/node.rs` is the conformance wrapper (budget clamp, truncation from engine total — unknown total forces `truncated = true`). Power users can implement the trait (HTTP adapter or subprocess to an external engine).
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- Onboarding: `frxd --onboarding` runs a wizard consuming a credential block (`id=.. token=.. registry=.. ma_key=..`) issued by the MA (`registry serve`; HTML page at `/`, `POST /v1/signup` queues a pending application, `POST /v1/enroll` binds keys and re-signs). Identity registration stays MA-side; the wizard never creates identities, only binds locally generated keys. Applications live in `<registry dir>/applications.json` (mode 600, MA contract data — never in the signed snapshot); `frxd registry approve <id>` promotes one (member stub + invite + credential block), and `frxd registry invite <id>` mints another single-use 24h token — one per node the member runs. Invites live in `<registry dir>/invites.json`. Prompts accept empty input as the default; scripted stdin works for tests.
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- Onboarding: `frxd --onboarding` runs a wizard consuming a credential block (`id=.. token=.. registry=.. ma_key=..`) issued by the MA (`registry serve`; HTML page at `/`, `POST /v1/signup` queues a pending application, `POST /v1/enroll` binds keys and re-signs). Identity registration stays MA-side; the wizard never creates identities, only binds locally generated keys. Applications live in `<registry dir>/applications.json` (mode 600, MA contract data — never in the signed snapshot); `frxd registry approve <id>` promotes one (member stub + credential block whose token is the member's reusable account credential, hashed in `<registry dir>/tokens.json` — authorizes key enrollment for every node the member runs); `frxd registry token <id>` mints another member token, `revoke-token <id>` revokes all of a member's tokens; `frxd registry invite <id>` mints a single-use 24h handoff token (`<registry dir>/invites.json`). Prompts accept empty input as the default; scripted stdin works for tests.
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- Next matching steps: eval harness with a small golden set (precision@k + false-silence rate), then a dense recall leg (model2vec-rs 0.2.1 exists but needs `default-features = false, features = ["fancy-regex", "local-only"]` for musl/airgapped; verify crate + model licenses before bundling), then an optional cross-encoder reranker. Embeddings are for recall; reranking is the precision tier.
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- Identity/registry (RFC Draft 0.5 §4/§6): MA-hosted FQDN identifiers first (`<label>.frx.<ma-domain>`, no DNS needed by users), signed versioned registry snapshot with the MA key pinned; envelope `from` = identifier, `key` = pubkey; registry outage fails static. Member-hosted identities, MA anchor rollover, and unicast confidentiality are §10 open. Implementation phases: A (signed registry snapshot) and B (identifier + `key` + JCS on the wire) are built and tested. Prioritize frictionless onboarding (users may be department-level and cannot create DNS).
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